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Electoral System and Gender Representation in
Sub-National Legislatures:
Is there a National—Sub-National Gender Gap?
RICHARD VENGROFF AND ZSOLT NYIRI, UNIVERSITY
MELISSA FUGIERO, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

OF

CONNECTICUT

Although there have been many studies which have looked at the impact of gender representation at the
national level, there are relatively few which explore the sub-national level. In this article we provide an exploration of the patterns of representation of women within democratic countries, both developed and transitional
that have elected regional, state, cantonal, or provincial legislatures which occupy the middle ground between
the central government and local or municipal administration. We provide a systematic comparative analysis
of women’s access to and representation in such bodies. The focus is on a cross-national comparison of gender
representation at the meso level and the gap in representation between meso and national legislatures. The
impact of electoral system type, party magnitude, economic development, constitutional structure, and institutionalization of democratic structures are examined. The data on which this analysis is based are drawn from
536 meso legislative bodies in 29 countries. This is supplemented by party level data (n = 1,348) for the issue
of party magnitude. Both OLS and logistical regression are used to test these propositions.

ticular concern to women (Andrew 1991; Ford and Dolan
1999). How women are re p resented in elective councils and
legislatures at this level may there f o re have a critical impact
on a broad range of policy issues in the future. In addition to
the critical areas of policy they address, meso elective bodies
may provide attractive opportunities and easier access for
women. These legislatures offer seats that are often less competitive, re q u i re less costly campaigns, and are less likely to
re q u i re relocation away from familial demands, all conditions which have traditionally inhibited women’s involvement in electoral politics (Lovenduski 1986). In addition,
they also may serve as an important recruiting ground for
women candidates for higher level offices.
In this study we explore the patterns of representation
of women within democratic countries, both advanced
industrial and developing, that have elected regional, state,
cantonal, county, or provincial legislatures which occupy
the middle ground between the central government and
local or municipal administration. Although there have
been many studies which have looked at the impact of electoral systems on gender re p resentation at the national
level, there are re latively few which explore the subnational level. For example, in a recently published re f e rence work, Women in Politics: World Bibliography, produced
for the Inter- p a r l i a m e n t a ry Union (IPU 1999), less than 4
out of 418 pages and only 19 of 650 titles are to be found
in the section on women in sub-national governments. Of
the articles on the subject, we generally find them limited
to examination of a single local government, sub-national
units within a single nation, such as the U.S. (MacManus et
al. 1999; Hawks and Staton 1999; Rule 1999; Ford and
Dolan 1999), a comparison of diff e rent systems functioning
at the sub-national level in the same country over time
(Jones 1998; also Rule 1994), or a comparison of local and/
or regional governments in a small number of countries

M

any critical policy issues such as the environment,
economic development, human resource development, health care, cultural issues and education transcend traditional local and municipal governments
but are diverse enough to require alternative policies and
solutions below the level of the central state. One major
response has been to create intermediate (meso) levels of
government between the central and local levels. These
“meso”-level governments and their councils or legislatures
are serving an increasingly important set of functions in the
world’s democracies. Among the many roles played by the
meso level are (1) addressing issues of regional and ethnic
nationalism; (2) provision of an increasing set of service
functions ranging from health to the environment, transportation, education, welfare, and regional planning; 3)
addressing the ideological association between decentralization and democracy and the redistribution of state power;
(4) providing the opportunity for the central state to serve
its own neo-liberal interests by downloading or dumping
significant functions to the “meso” level while avoiding the
need to raise central taxes (Sharpe 1993).
MESO LEGISLATIVE BODIES:
A SPECIAL CASE FOR GENDER REPRESENTATION
For all of these reasons meso governments have become
increasingly important, especially in relation to issues of par-
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(Considine and Deutchman 1996; Matland and Studlar
1996; Downs 1998).
We undertake a broader comparison of “meso” (subnational, intermediate) legislatures in both advanced industrial democracies (AINDs) and democracies in less developed countries (LDCDs). Here we provide a systematic
analysis of women’s access to and representation in such
bodies. We place emphasis on the differential impact of
formal electoral systems on the election of women at the
meso level. We also examine the relationship between representation at the meso level and in national legislatures, the
national– sub-national gender gap.
There is a well established and growing literature on the
impact of electoral systems and electoral system reform on
the representation of women in national legislative bodies
(Darcy, Welch, and Clarke 1994; Matland and Taylor 1997;
Caul 1999; Rule 1987, 1994; Schmitter 1998; MacIvor
1996). In general, these studies have concluded that more
women are elected in proportional rather than in plurality
or majority electoral systems. Furthermore, these studies
show that electoral arrangements do affect not just electoral
outcomes, but opportunities for women as candidates.
Electoral results in industrialized countries generally suggest that list pro p o rtional re p resentation systems are more
conducive to women gaining office than are single member
plurality district systems. For example, in a study of “stable
democracies,” Darcy, Welch and Clarke (1994: 142) argue
that, “on average twice a pro p o rtion of women (20.2 percent) are currently elected to list PR systems as compared to
SMD (10.2 percent),”(also see Reynolds, Reilley et al. 1997).
Vengroff, Creevey, and Krisch (2000) confirm this finding
using more recent electoral data and including a third categ o ry, mixed systems. In the comparison of 153 lower houses,
they found the percentage of women in pro p o rtional, mixed
and plurality/majority systems to be 14.7, 11.5, and 7.9 percent, respectively (p < .001).
Women form small minorities in most legislatures but
they are an even smaller group where there is a plurality
electoral system. In the United States, for example, where
feminist political movements have reputedly had a marked
political impact, only 13 out of 100 senators and only 61
(14 percent) out of 435 Representatives were women in
2001 (IPU, 2001). This contrasts rather sharply with several
Scandinavian democracies, which have list proportional
representation systems. In these countries women occupy a
significantly greater number of legislative seats: 42.7 percent
in Sweden, 37.4 percent in Denmark, 36.4 percent in
Norway in 1998 as compared to 13.3 percent in the United
States in that year, for example (see IPU 1999; also Darcy,
Welch, and Clark, 1994: 142). Many authors attribute this
difference in representation primarily to the existence of an
SMD electoral system in the U.S. (Rule and Norris 1992: 41;
also see Rule 1999: 195; and Amy 1993:108).
The impacts of the type of electoral system are affected
themselves by a variety of contextual and socioeconomic factors, such as education of the population as a whole, and of
women at the college level, high employment of women in
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the workforce and low unemployment overall (Rule 1987,
1999), strength of fundamentalist religion (Welch and Studlar 1986), profession of legislators, incumbency (Bullock and
MacManus 1991; Kushner, Siegal, and Stanwick 1997; Studlar and McAllister 1991; Studlar and Welch 1991) the level
of organization and strength of women’s groups (Chapman
1993: 11; Caul 1997; Maille 1990) and “contagion” (Matland and Studlar 1996; Reynolds and Reilly et al. 1997: 5)
especially where some of the political parties adopt quotas,
and campaign finance and fundraising issues.
Traditionally, women’s roles in many societies are conceived to be inconsistent with competing for, or holding of,
political office. The socialization hypothesis suggests that
women are not interested in competing for such posts
because of internalized values (Darcy, Welch, and Clark
1994: 104-18; Whicker and Whitaker 1999: 172-73). In
addition, it is often argued that the pool of qualified women
from which potential candidates can be drawn is small, i.e.,
the supply thesis (Randall 1987; Darcy, Welch, and Clark
1994; see also Gidengil and Vengroff 1997a, 1997b). All
three of these factors have undergone dramatic changes in
the advanced industrial countries (AINDs) but not exclusively in those countries (Rule and Zimmerman 1992;
Welch and Studlar 1986; Ford and Dolan 1999).
Women are still handicapped in the competition for
political office. Significantly fewer women than men present
themselves as candidates and few are chosen as candidates
for either safe or competitive seats. In fact, the GEM (the
United Nations’ gender empowerment measure) continues
to show important disparities in gender re p resentation, even
in the best of cases such as the Scandinavian countries
(UNDP 1998). However, it is generally accepted that access
for women to local and meso-level elective office is greater
than it is for national legislative seats (Darcy, Welch, and
Clark, 1994; Matland and Studlar 1998; Lovenduski and
N o rris 1993; Rule 1999; Ford and Dolan 1999). Furt h e rm o re, there has been a slow but steady increase in the re p resentation of women in meso legislatures. In cases for which
we have data on multiple elections at the meso level we find
a modest average increase of 2.7 percent (n = 203). Overall
56.7 percent of these bodies saw increases in the percent of
women members, 17.2 percent showed no change, and over
a quarter (26.1 percent) showed a decline in the repre s e n t ation of women (see also Gidengil and Vengroff 1997a).
Our research highlights the influence of electoral rules
and selection decisions. Indeed, most scholars still believe
that “the most striking source of variation in the proportion
of women in national legislatures is... the kind of electoral
system in use” (Chapman 1993). We hypothesize this to be
the case at the meso level and explore the question in a variety of democratic countries. Our hypotheses is that
although the meso level provides greater access and potentially more representation for women in democratic systems
than does the national legislature, the electoral formula still
plays an important role. This should be especially apparent
in systems that have different electoral systems at the
national and meso levels.

ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND GENDER REPRESENTATION IN SUB-NATIONAL LEGISLATURES
One very critical and potentially confounding factor
which has gained broad currency in the literature is party
magnitude. By party magnitude we mean the number of
seats a party reasonably expects to win in the next legislature. Matland, for example, argues that the representation of
women in legislative bodies may be more a function of the
size or expected number of seats a party anticipates winning
than of electoral system type. The larger the “party magnitude” presents, the greater the representation of women
(Matland 1998; Matland and Brown 1992; Matland and
Studlar 1996). We test this proposition at the meso level.
Overall level of “development” may be a highly significant factor intervening between electoral system type and
the impact of the latter on the likelihood of women being
elected to a parliament. Matland (1998) studied women’s
representation in national legislatures in 24 industrialized
countries and 16 LDCs with democratic regimes in 1980,
1990, and 1997. His results tend to indicate that in LDCs
the electoral system variable does not have a significant
impact on the likelihood of women being elected to parliament nor did most of the other principal variables discussed
above. His conclusion is that “there appears to be a threshold, a minimum development level . . . needed to create the
foundation for other variables to have an effect. Below that
level the variables that assist women in gaining representation in more developed countries simply have no effect”
(Matland 1998: 120). It appears that the forces aligned
against female political activity are so great in LDCs as to
permit only token representation regardless of electoral
system type. As development increases, however, Matland
(1009: 120) observes more women are able to acquire the
resources to become politically relevant (Matland, 1998:
120). The sample for the latter study was limited but it
nonetheless raises important questions. In any analysis of
gender representation, even at the meso level, this factor
must be taken into account.
DATA AND METHODS
The data on which this analysis is based are part of an
original data set compiled by the authors (available from the
authors on request). The selection of the countries included
in this study is based on three important criteria: (1) the existence of a democratic government; and (2) the existence of
sub-national elected legislative bodies which are interm e d ia ry between local or municipal and national governments
(what are labeled meso level by Sharpe 1993). That is these
units must take in more than a single municipality, town, village or other local authority. These vary from country to
c o u n t rybut include entities that are variously labeled region,
province, state, canton, or even county. Included are countries that are formally federal in structure as well as those that
are officially unitary states; and finally, (3) the availability of
accurate, reliable data on meso elections in the 1990s (the
most recent meso elections in each country were selected).
Our group of democracies includes both AINDs and
LDCD nations which have elected meso-level legislative
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bodies. Among the former are 12 of the 15 EU countries
(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United
Kingdom) plus Norway, Switzerland, Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, and the U.S.A. This part of the sample,
includes data on representation in 286 meso legislatures in
these 18 countries.
The other group of democracies was established based
on macroeconomic indicators reported by the World Bank’s
World Development Report. These less developed democratic
countries range from upper-middle-income to low-income
and include meso governments from Argentina, Brazil,
Mexico, Venezuela, Poland, Hungary, Russia, India, South
Africa, Nigeria and Senegal. Less developed democracies add
an additional 250 sub-national legislative bodies from eleven
countries to our data set. Our total sample of meso legislat u res thus consists of 536 such bodies from 29 countries.
To test for the impact of party magnitude we compiled a
second data set on meso legislatures in which the unit of
analysis is the party. Given the need for accurate party level
data for multiple meso elections the sample countries were
limited to twelve European democracies. We have included
the party magnitude and number and percent of a party’s
seats held by women for 1,348 cases in the sub-national legislatures of these countries for meso elections held in the
1990s. If party magnitude indeed has the important effects
attributed to it, it is more likely to apply in these AINDs
than in the LDCDs. If it shows an important relationship
with gender representation in these 1,348 cases it could be
argued that comparable data should be collected for LCDCs.
Hypotheses
Our first tests are to see if the factors associated with the
representation of women, including the well-documented
relationship between electoral system type and the representation of women in national legislatures, also holds at the
“meso” level. We then check to see if the level of representation of women is greater at the sub-national than the
national level. This is expected because of the less cumbersome set of barriers faced by women who want to participate in politics at the meso level. Therefore, two basic sets
of hypotheses have been formulated. First we examine the
representation of women in mesos:
H1.1: The representation of women in meso legislatures will
vary with electoral system type, the highest percent
being in those using proportional electoral systems, followed by those using mixed systems and finally by
those employing plurality/majority systems.
Then we look at the impact of party magnitude:
H1.2: The percentage of women elected from a party should
increase with the magnitude or expected magnitude of
that party in the legislature.
As noted above, the level of economic development of a
nation or region may have important consequences for
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gender representation. We expect representation at all levels
to be higher in AIND countries.
H1.3: The representation of women in meso legislatures will
increase with the level of development.
Finally, the constitutional structure of the country, federal
vs. a unitary state could be expected to influence representational issues.
H1.4: There will be significant differences between federal
and unitary states in the representation of women.
With our second set of hypotheses we look at the gap
between meso and national level legislative representation
of women. Based on our review of the literature we expect
that women will be better represented in mesos than in
national legislatures:
H2.1: The percentage of women in meso legislatures will be
higher than the percentage of women in their respective national legislatures.
Given the importance of electoral systems:
H2.2: The national–meso gender gap will vary with the electoral system type.
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TABLE 1
ELECTORAL SYSTEM, LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT AND
GENDER REPRESENTATION IN MESO LEGISLATURES*

Electoral System Type
(meso legislature)
Advanced Industrial Democracies
(AIND)
Plurality/Majority
Mixed**
Proportional
Total
Developing Country Democracies
(LDC)
Plurality/Majority
Mixed
Proportional
Total
Combined
Plurality/Majority
Mixed
Proportional
Total (N)

n

Mean
Percentage
of Women
in Meso
Legislatures

78
38
170
286

23.5
21.0
29.1
26.5

111
36
103
250

10.3
18.6
14.8
13.3

189
74
273
536

15.8
19.8
23.7
20.4

We must take account of the fact that the type of electoral
system in play at the national and meso levels within countries is not always the same. Hence:

*p < .001
**systems “where different formulas . . . are used simultaneously in the
same election (Blais and Masicotte (1996: 65).

H2.3: If the electoral system types at the national and meso
levels differ the gap between them in gender representation will be greater.

system, moving from 15.8 percent in the majoritarian to 19.8
in the mixed and 23.7 in the pro p o rtional systems (H1.1).
We need to also explore the degree to which the impact
of electoral system types varies between AIND and LDC
democracies. In the AIND democracies those meso legislatures which use a proportional electoral system of some type
have significantly higher percentages of women holding
seats than do those using either majoritarian or mixed systems. The key finding here is that in AIND sub-national legislatures using proportional electoral systems the percentage
of women legislators is on average nearly twenty-five percent greater than is the case in majoritarian systems and
nearly forty percent greater than in mixed systems.
The expected relationship holds only in part at the meso
level for LDC democracies in our sample. Proportional systems have nearly 44 percent greater gender representation
in meso legislatures than do plurality systems. The mixed
category is even more impressive. However, the small
number of both cases and nations which include most of the
meso units in this category, make generalizations somewhat
problematic.
In each electoral system category among the LDCD
democracies the percentages of women represented are considerably lower than is the case for the comparable groups
in established industrial democracies. Consistent with Matland (1998) there is a major difference by level of development in the overall presence of women at the meso level

As noted above, the gender representation gap between
meso and national legislatures will also vary with the level
of economic development and the character of the state
(federal/unitary).
H2.4: As the level of economic development increases, the
gender representation gap between meso and national
legislatures will decrease.
H2.5: There will be significant differences between federal
and unitary states in the national–meso gender gap.
We will test all nine of these hypotheses using bivariate
analysis before moving on to a multivariate analysis that will
allow us to view their relative impact along with that of
other critical factors.
Findings: Gender Representation at the Meso Level
It is our expectation that the representation of women at
the meso level, as is the case in national legislatures, will vary
with the type of electoral system. As can be seen from Table
1, the percent of women in meso legislatures increases significantly (p < .001) with the degree of pro p o rtionality in the

ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND GENDER REPRESENTATION IN SUB-NATIONAL LEGISLATURES
(H1.3). However, unlike his results, the plurality/majority–
proportional relationship to gender representation is relatively strong. In general it appears that regardless of the level
of development, the electoral system type is quite important
in elections at the sub-national level as well as at the
national level.
Two additional factors, the relative wealth of the geographic entities being compared and the institutional issues
associated with the unitary or federal structure of the state,
require some consideration. The formal structure of the
state (federal–unitary) may be of some importance even
though the influence of this factor seems to have diminished
over time with the growth of meso government units in unitary states. In fact we find significant differences in women’s
representation in subnational legislatures between unitary
and federal states. Meso legislatures in the former (n = 177)
average 18.6 percent women while in the latter (n = 359)
24.0 percent (F = 24.2, p < .001). Even when we control for
electoral system type, the impact of the federal–unitary
structure remains statistically significant (H1.4).
As noted above, when we employ our AIND democracies/LDC democracies variable as a very rough proxy for
wealth at the national level H1.3 is confirmed. In the case of
actual meso wealth, we were able to collect and calculate a
rough measure in the form of the GDP per capita for 223 of
the meso “regions” in our sample). Unfortunately, the lack
of overlap between mesos and boundaries for which income
data are collected, and the difficulty of collecting such data
in less developed countries severely limited our sample.
Thus, from the LDC countries, only Mexico’s states are
included in our sample for which data on GDP are available.
The correlation between wealth as measured by
GDP/cap at the meso level and the representation of women
is significant but only moderate in strength (r = .31, p <
.001, n = 223). This cross-national examination potentially
masks a more important relationship that may come into
play within countries. In order to obviate the problem of the
small n in some countries and the possibility of serious distortions produced by one or two outliers we examine both
the Pearson and the rank correlations (Spearman’s rho)
within countries.
In only four nations does the wealth factor seem to covary with meso gender representation, Austria, Canada,
Italy and the U.S. In Austria and Canada the relationship is
very strong (r = .77 p < .01, rho = .82 and r = .76 p < .05,
rho = .63, respectively) and statistically significant indicating that gender representation in state/provincial legislatures is strongly associated with the relative wealth of the
area. The relationship holds (is statistically significant) but
is somewhat weaker for the state legislatures in the U.S. (r =
.38 p < .03, rho = .32) and the Italian Regions (r = .39 p <
.05, rho = .46).
The Case of Party Magnitude
Recall that it is widely stated in the literature that party
magnitude is positively and strongly associated with gender
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representation in legislatures. We first look at the relationship between party magnitude and the number of women
elected to a meso legislature from a party. Not surprisingly
there is a positive and very strong correlation between the
two (r = .84, p < .001, n = 1,348). What this indicates, however, is that parties holding many seats have more women
(in absolute terms) than do smaller parties.
The more critical question is whether party magnitude
is related to either the percent of women elected by a
party or the percent of women in the legislative body.
That is, do large party magnitudes translate into gre a t e r
relative re p resentation of women among a part y ’s elected
legislators than do small party magnitudes. Is there any
systematic relationship whatsoever between the two? We
first divided the sample into those parties that exceed the
p e rcent of women in their respective meso legislatures (n
= 581) and those that are equal to or less re p resentative of
women than their respective meso legislature (n = 767).
We then ran an Anova, comparing the mean party magnitude of the two groups. Consistent with expectations,
there is a significant diff e rence (F = 7.79, p < .005, n =
1,348) between the two, with the former holding on average just over ten seats while the figure for the latter is only
8.4. The significance of this relationship may be more a
function of the sample size than the strength of the re l ationship. When we compute the correlation between
party magnitude and the percent of women among the
party’s legislators, the relationship, although significant is
e x t remely weak (r = .07, p < .01). This would indicate
that party magnitude accounts for about one half of 1 percent of the variance in gender re p resentation in a part y ’s
legislative delegation. In sum, party magnitude does not
play an important role in the relative re p resentation of
women (H1.2).
In addition, we ran the same statistical tests within
countries to see if the impact is different in different systems. In only one case, Germany, did we find a significant
and even as much as a moderate relationship. In that country the relationship runs just the opposite of expectations.
That is, the percent of women in a party’s delegation in a
meso legislature is inversely related to party magnitude (r =
–.35, p < .01). In two other countries, France and the
Netherlands the correlations are positive as expected but
relatively weak (r = .14 and r = .26 respectively).
The perceived and widely cited relationship is more a
function of perceptions of the absolute rather than the relative numbers of women sent to the legislature by parties of
different sizes. In fact, some of the smaller parties such as
the various incarnations of the Greens are more likely to
have gender equity promoting regulations in place. In many
cases these parties may have high percentages of women
among their relatively small delegations of elected representatives, thus canceling out the potential impact of party
magnitude. There is also some indication of a diffusion
affect of gender quotas from smaller to larger parties. This
test applies to the meso level but the authors believe its
effects are similar in national legislatures.
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TABLE 2
OLS MODEL FOR PREDICTING THE PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN IN MESO LEGISLATURE*
Variables
Constant
Plurality System
Proportional System
Level of Development
Federal/Unitary
Relative Proportionality of Electoral Systems

B

Standard Error

Beta

t

Sig

18.181
–5.583
3.185
13.496
0.378
–5.385

1.774
1.472
1.29
0.91
1.037
1.088

–0.219
0.131
0.554
0.015
–0.223

10.251
–3.792
2.469
14.833
0.365
–4.950

0.000
0.000
0.014
0.000
0.715
0.000

*R2 = 0.364, Adjusted R2 = 0.358; F = 60.644; p < 0.001, n = 535.

Multivariate Analysis: Gender Representation in Mesos
We employ OLS regression (see Table 2) in order to determine which factors contribute and the relative contribution of
each to an explanation of the level of women’s representation
in meso legislatures. We have tested several models including
a variety of combinations of variables before settling on the
most elegant and theoretically satisfying.
Our dependent variable is the percentage of women in
the meso legislature. The independent variables include
level of development (AIND or LDC democracy), electoral
system type (a dummy variable for plurality system and
another for proportional system), the national institutional
structure (a binary variable, federal or unitary), and a measure of the relative proportionality of the central and meso
legislatures’ electoral systems. The collective importance of
the three electoral system variables is predominant. The difference between AIND and LDC democracies is almost
equally powerful. Our federal/unitary state measure fails to
reach a level of statistical significance and has virtually no
impact. We also examined the size of the legislature but it
has no impact on the proportion of women holding seats.
Overall, the model explains more than a third of the variance in levels of gender re p resentation at the meso level
(R2 = .364, p < .001, n = 535).
Findings: The National–Meso Gender Gap
It is our expectation that due to the existence of fewer
potential barriers women will in general be better represented

in their meso than in their national legislatures. As can be
seen from Table Three, this appears to be the case. The difference between gender representation in meso and national
legislatures is significant and in the expected direction, but
relatively weak (H2.1). In 56 percent of the meso legislatures
gender representation is greater than is the case in their
respective national legislatures (see Table 3).
For mixed and pro p o rtional systems the representation
of women in meso legislatures exceeds that of the national
legislature in about three out of five (60.5 percent for mixed
and 58.2 percent of PR) cases as well. Indeed, for plurality/majority electoral systems in AIND democracies, re p resentation in sub-national legislatures is greater than in the
respective national legislatures in nearly three out of four
(74.4 percent) cases and in a greater percentage of cases than
for either of the other two types of electoral systems. The
average gaps between meso and national re p resentation are
also significantly larger for plurality/majority systems (H2.2).
Meso legislatures using plurality electoral systems are
more likely than either mixed or proportional systems to
have greater gender representation at the subnational than
the national level. Furthermore, given the greater access
women have in multi-member districts under PR electoral
systems, we expect any gap between the national and meso
legislatures to be smaller where PR is used at both levels.
Majoritarian systems should on the other hand show greater
national-sub-national differences in favor of women’s representation at the meso level. The data are consistent with this
interpretation, the largest difference between meso and
national gender representation occurring in the majoritarian
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TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN IN MESO AND NATIONAL LEGISLATURES, ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES
VS. DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEMOCRACIES*

Advanced Industrial Countries (AIND)
Developing Countries (LDC)
Total
*p < 0.001

Mesos
(mean % women
by nation)

National
Legislatures
(% women)

% of Mesos
with >% women
than national
legislature)

Mean difference
in % women
(local-national)

26.5 (n = 286)
13.3 (n = 250)
21.5 (n = 536)

24.6 (n = 18)
14.7 (n = 11)
20.8 (n = 29)

62.9 (n = 286)
48 (n = 250)
56.0 (n = 536)

2.92
–-0.47
1.34
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systems (3.2 percent, compared with 1.1 and 0.7 percent
for mixed and proportional respectively). Gaps can be
expected to be greatest where the electoral system types are
different at the two levels, with the advantage going to the
level with the more proportional system (F = 7.7, p < .001).
Also of interest here are the residuals because these help
us to identify those countries which do not conform to the
overall pattern very well. France, the U.K. and the U.S.
stand out. These three countries show very large divergences between national and sub-national gender representation, with the sub-national showing much greater equity.
The average difference in these countries in the percent of
women (national vs. meso) strongly favors the sub-national
by 13 percent, 11.7 percent, and 10.2 percent, respectively.
The first two cases are especially important in illustrating
the impact of the electoral system because they use different
types at the national and meso levels (H2.3).
In the case of France the electoral system at the national
level is two rounds with a majority required in the first
round and a plurality in the second round. The electoral
system for the regional councils is proportional by party list.
France has consistently had relatively low women’s representation in the National Assembly (until 2002 elections
when candidate quotas were employed), particularly for an
advanced industrial democracy. Ranking 58th on the IPU
list (IPU 2001 Women in Parliaments, World Classification)
it is surpassed by every industrialized democracy except
Italy (68th) and Japan (87th). At least part of the gender gap
in representation in the Chamber of Deputies has been
attributed to the restrictive electoral process and single seat
constituencies. At the regional level, however, the electoral
system is highly proportional, generates relatively low vote/
seat distortions, has large multimember districts and closed
party lists. In 21 of the 22 Regional Councils (Corsica is the
exception) the percentage of women exceeds that in the
national legislature. On average, the regional councils surpass the National Assembly by over 13 percent in the representation of women.
For the U.K. there are only three sub-national meso legislatures in existence, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. The first two use a mixed system for their elections as
opposed to the classic FPTP of the national Parliament. In
the case of Wales, 40 percent of the seats are held by women
and in Scotland, 37.2 percent compared with only 17.9 percent for the national Parliament. In Northern Ireland,
although its electoral system (STV) is considered to be “proportional,” women’s representation remains relatively low
(13 percent). The long-standing conflict, competing religious communities, a large number of parties and relatively
small district magnitude (m = 6), make gender representation there more problematic (Welch and Studlar 1995).
The U.S. case presents a different puzzle. Elections at
both national and meso (state) levels are based on the same
type of system, SMD but the meso national gap is quite
large. Gender representation in state legislatures has grown
slowly but steadily over the years, moving from 19.5 percent in 1993 (Rule 1994: 690) to 23.5 percent in 1999.
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Currently, in 44 of the 50 states the percentage of women in
the State legislature is greater than that in the U.S. House of
Representatives. Among the exceptions only two state legislatures, Alabama and Kentucky (7.6 and 8.9 percent women
respectively) are significantly lower in female representation
than is the Congress (14 percent).
Does the pattern found in the U.S. hold across nations
that have majority/plurality systems at both levels? Canada,
Australia, and India, all of which use majoritarian electoral
formulas at the meso level (two of Australia’s mesos do not),
are the other systems in our sample which may provide
some evidence in this regard. In Canada, with FPTP elections in all provinces the national parliament and collectively the provincial parliaments have roughly the same percent of women, 19.9 percent and 20.4 percent respectively.
Half of the provinces and two of the three territories rank
below the national parliament and the other half and the
remaining territory are above it. In the case of Australia, five
of the six states and one of the two territories use a majoritarian electoral system while Tasmania and the Capital Territory use a proportional system. Electoral system type
seems to play a limited role. Tasmania, with a proportional
system just barely exceeds the national parliamentary distribution while Victoria, even with a majoritarian system actually has a female majority (51 percent). Five of the six
majoritarian legislatures are close to the national parliament
in gender representation.
In India, 22 of the 27 state parliaments are less representative of women than is the national parliament. In only
one state, Delhi, is the margin in favor of the state legislature
significant (12.9 percent compared to 8.8 percent in the
national parliament). This is a case where culture and the
level of development clearly come into play. However, a
quota system requiring one third of local (but not meso)
councillors to be women has been in existence since 1993,
producing a core of experienced, potential future candidates
for the state legislatures. A bill debated in the last three parliaments would require quotas at the state (meso) and
national level as well.
Mexico is of interest here because it uses a mixed system
for the national congress but FPTP at the state level. Consistent with expectations regarding electoral system effects,
in an overwhelming majority of cases the individual state
legislatures have fewer women (in percentages) than does
the Congress. Furthermore, when the meso-level data are
aggregated, gender representation at the national level
exceeds that of the states by a wide margin.
Another disparity for consideration is that which exists
in two countries using proportional representation at both
the national and meso levels, Denmark and the Netherlands. These countries rank 2nd and 5th in the world in
terms of gender representation in their national legislatures.
In electorally and culturally similar Sweden and Norway
(1st and 4th in gender representation nationally) aggregate
meso-level representation of women actually exceeds that of
the national legislature. In most counties in Sweden (18 of
21, 86 percent) and in Norway (16 of 19, 84 percent), the
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TABLE 4
MULTINOMIAL LOGISTICAL REGRESSION FOR PREDICTING GENDER REPRESENTATION GAP BETWEEN NATIONAL AND MESO LEGISLATURES
Variables
Intercept
% of Women in Local Legislatures
Plurality
Proportional
Federal/Unitary
Relative Proportionality of Electoral Systems
Level of Development

2 Log Likelihood
of Reduced Model

Chi-Square

Degrees of
Freedom

Sig

519.028
684.396
526.696
523.253
519.437
543.564
530.070

0
165.368
7.668
4.225
0.410
24.537
11.043

0
1
1
1
1
2
1

—
0.000
0.006
0.040
0.522
0.000
0.001

Pseudo R2 Nagelkerke = 0.404.

percent of women representatives is greater than that in the
national legislature. In Denmark and the Netherlands,
where women’s representation in the national legislature is
roughly equivalent to that of Norway and Sweden, there is
a surprisingly wide gap in favor of the national legislature.
In Denmark, the gap when calculated over all meso units
(counties) is 8.9 percent, with 13 of 14 councils having a
lower percentage of women than the national. In Netherlands the comparable figures are 9.2 percent for the gap and
11 of 12 of the provincial legislatures having relatively fewer
women at this level. In the case of Denmark, this may be
related to the relatively small size of the county councils and
the associated district magnitude. In the Netherlands the
use of a single national constituency and the associated high
degree of proportionality for the national legislature compared to smaller district magnitude provincially may have
some impact. Leijenaar (1997) suggest that the party system
at the provincial level is an important factor as well.
As noted above, there may be differences between the
AINDs and the LDCs in the national meso gender gap. The
gap is larger for advanced industrial democracies (H2.4, F =
19.7, p < .001). Of the 286 meso legislatures in this category, gender representation at the sub-national level is
greater than the national in 180 (63 percent). The situation
is quite different in those nations considered transitional.
Their mesos tend to be evenly split with a slim majority (52
percent) being less representative of women than their
respective national legislatures. The average gap between
the two levels is, however, much smaller in these systems
than in the AINDs.
In order to answer the question of whether the same cultural factors that affect women’s re p resentation at the
national level impact on such representation at the meso
level we examine this relationship in two ways. First we
compute the correlation between the percent of women in
the meso legislatures and their national level counterparts.
The correlation between gender representation at the two
levels is very strong and significant (r = .70, p < .001, n =
536). It is equally strong when we do the same calculation
for the 286 and 250 meso units in the AIND and LDC
democracies respectively (r = .63 and r = .56, p < .001).
However, there may be considerable variance between

regions within a given country (Rule 1994) in the gender
distribution of representatives they send to the national
level. Since women legislators in the national assemblies
may be concentrated in certain regions or areas (Norrander
and Wilcox 1998) our look at access at the meso level
should also take this into account when disparities are being
calculated.
An alternative way to check this relationship was therefore also undertaken. For each nation included in our
sample we have aggregated the total number of seats available in sub-national legislatures and the total number of
female officeholders and calculated the overall percent of
seats in meso legislatures held by women nationally. We use
this aggregate measure to compare with the percent of
women in the national legislature.
Since we are now comparing meso units aggregated by
nation our n has become smaller (n = 29, 18 AIND and 11
LDC democracies). We therefore report both Pearson’s r and
a rank correlation (Spearman’s rho) so as to take into
account the possibility of an outlier distorting the strength
of the relationship in the former. For our 29 nations the correlations are quite strong (r = .85, p < .001, rho = .84, p <
.001) indicating that the overall representation of women at
the sub-national level and at the national level are very
closely related. When we disaggregate we find very strong
relationships for both AIND democracies (r = .77, p < .001,
rho = .74, p < .001) and the LDC democracies (r = .93, p <
.001, rho = .85, p < .001).
We now perform a multivariate test on the gap in gender
representation between the national and the meso legislature (see Table 4). For our dependent variable we have classified all of the mesos into two categories, those in which
gender representation is greater at the meso than the
national level and those in which representation is greater at
the national than the meso level. Because this variable is
nominal, we employ multinomial logistical regression rather
than OLS. The independent variables include the same list
employed in our OLS regression, level of development, electoral system type, the federal-unitary state measure, and a
measure of the relative proportionality of the central and
meso electoral systems, and the percent of women in the
meso legislature.

ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND GENDER REPRESENTATION IN SUB-NATIONAL LEGISLATURES
This model successfully classifies 75 percent of our 534
cases, (71 percent of those where there is a greater percent
of women in the national legislature and 78 percent of those
where the percentage of women is greater in the meso legislature). The pseudo R2 (Nagelkerke) is .40. As can be seen
from Table 4, electoral system factors account for a very significant part of the success in classification. Thus, for example, having a plurality electoral system at the meso level
decreases the likelihood of having better gender representation in the national than in the meso legislature. The same
is true where different electoral systems are in place at the
meso and national levels with greater proportionality in the
meso than the national electoral system contributing to a
gap in gender representation favorable to the meso. Our
proxy variable for economic development, AIND/LDC is
likewise an important contributor in the model. Also of
some interest is the fact that the nature of the state structure,
federal/unitary does not have a significant impact on our
dependent variable.
CONCLUSIONS
The number of countries employing meso-level legislat u res or councils to address critical policy issues has
expanded rapidly in recent years as part of the adoption of a
broad strategy of decentralization. Gender representation
and access to elective legislatures at this level has there f o re
become of critical importance. In this study we examined the
representation of women in meso legislatures and the gap in
representation between national and meso legislative bodies.
The representation of women in mesos is influenced in
important ways by the proportionality of the electoral
system and a country’s level of economic development but
not by the unitary/federal character of the state, party magnitude, or size of the legislature. Consistent with findings
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for national legislatures the representation of women was
found to be influenced in important ways by the electoral
system, proportional systems generally providing for greater
representation of women and plurality systems much less
so. This is confirmed also in those cases where the national
and the meso electoral systems are of different types (e.g.,
France, Mexico, the U.K.). The level of economic development, extent to which a democratic country has an
advanced industrial as opposed to a less developed or transitional economy, is also of importance. Surprisingly, party
magnitude, although widely cited in the literature, was
found to have no relationship to the level of gender representation. Of some note is the fact that the federal or unitary
character of a state per se seems to have no impact.
Our findings show that women are in general better represented, although the differences are modest, in their meso
than in their national legislatures. The gender representation gap between national and meso legislatures is heavily
influenced by electoral system proportionality, national
meso differences in electoral system type and level of economic development. Overall meso-level gender representation is positively and strongly correlated with national legislative representation of women. Although there is some
variation, the relationship is more likely to run from the
local to the national in the industrial democracies in which
meso units have had a long existence and the reverse in
those in which meso units are relatively new creations.
As transitional countries become more industrialized we
expect the gap in gender representation between levels to
decline. What is quite clear, however, is that when we look
at gender representation overall in the meso unit or the
national meso gap in such representation, electoral system
type and the contrast (where it exists) between national and
meso electoral system types will continue to have a major
impact on gender representation.
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APPENDIX A
THE COUNTRIES, MESO LEGISLATURES, YEARS OF ELECTION, AND ELECTORAL TYPE USED IN THE ANALYSES*

Country

Unit

Year**

Electoral System

Argentina
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Brazil
Canada
Denmark
France
Germany
Hungary
India
Ireland
Italy
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nigeria
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Russia
Senegal
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States of America
Venezuela

42 provinces
6 (1) States, 2 (1) territories
9/6 provinces
5 regions, 8 provinces
26 states
10 provinces, 3 territories
14 counties
22 regions
16 states
19 counties, 1 capital city
27/10 states
26 county
20/19 regions
31 states
12 province
9 regions
1 state
19 counties
16 regions
2 regions
90 oblast
10 regions
9 provinces
19 regions
25 county
23 cantons
3 regions
50 states
23 states

1995
1995 and 1999
1991-1999
1995 and 1999
1998
1991-1999
1993 and 1997
1992 and 1998
1990-1999
1998
1994-2000
1999
1993-2000
1998
1998
1999
1999
1999 and 1995
1998
1996
1995-1998
1998
1994-1999
1994 and 1999
1998
1997-2002
1998 and 1999
1999 and 2000
1998

PR
Majority/Plurality
PR
Mixed
Mixed
Majority/Plurality
PR
PR
Mixed
PR
Majority/Plurality
PR
Mixed
Majority/Plurality
PR
Majority/Plurality
PR
PR
PR
PR
Majority/Plurality
Mixed
PR
PR
PR
PR
Mixed, STV***
Majority/Plurality
Mixed

*The complete data set, including a list of all mesos included, election dates and data sources are available form the authors on request.
**Multiple years mean that elections were held at different times for some units.
***Scotland and Wales are Mixed and Northern Ireland is STV.
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